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WHY PROPERTY AND DEMOCRACY ARE NOT ALWAYS ALLIES 
MICHAEL F. BROWN* 
Private property has sparked spirited debate, I suspect, ever since some 
long-forgotten leader tried to persuade members of his Neolithic community 
that it was the Next Big Thing.  One of property’s striking features is that 
although it probably enjoyed little salience for most of human history, over the 
last two millennia or so it has managed to elbow its way onto the list of 
society’s prime movers, forces that have shaped everyday life in profound 
ways. 
By the nineteenth century, Western thinkers had recognized that property 
was an issue of transcendent importance, but they were sharply divided on its 
moral implications.  Property optimists hailed it as the cornerstone of civilized 
life.  Lewis Henry Morgan, an attorney from Rochester, New York, whose 
curiosity about the roots of civilization led him to write one of anthropology’s 
first great works of historical comparison, Ancient Society, observed, “The idea 
of property was slowly formed in the human mind, remaining nascent and 
feeble through immense periods of time . . . Its dominance as a passion over all 
other passions marks the commencement of civilization.”1  Writing at roughly 
the same time as Morgan, Karl Marx famously denounced private property as a 
force that alienated people from their work and ultimately from themselves.2  
As such, it was a social pathology destined for extinction. 
History has been kinder to Morgan than to Marx, and we find ourselves in 
an era in which the system of private property has largely triumphed over other 
ways of organizing human economic affairs.  As Professor Carol M. Rose says 
in the Childress Lecture with her accustomed lucidity, this is primarily because 
privatization imbues economic matters with the “efficiency, energy and 
innovation that are thought to accompany decentralized individual initiatives.”3  
Professor Rose clearly subscribes to the idea that, on balance, private property 
 
* Lambert Professor of Anthropology & Latin American Studies, Williams College. 
 1. LOUIS HENRY MORGAN, ANCIENT SOCIETY 13 (Leslie A. White ed., 1964) (1877). 
 2. See Jonathan Wolff, Karl Marx, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Edward N. Zalta, ed., Fall 2003), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/entries/marx/> 
(referring to KARL MARX, THE ECONOMIC & PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844 (Dirk J. 
Struik, ed., International Publishers, 9th ed. 1976) (1932)). 
 3. Carol M. Rose, Privatization—The Road to Democracy?, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 691, 692 
(2006). 
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benefits society, largely because the management of property, and the 
everyday performance of rights associated with it, provides a template for 
other democratic rights.4  She allows that certain political conditions are 
necessary for privatization to produce the desired results.5  The state should 
insure broad access to information, for instance, and it must enforce laws with 
fairness and consistency.  To advance democratic principles, property cannot 
be too unevenly distributed.  If these political conditions are met, then property 
works its magic. 
Although Professor Rose’s upbeat assessment of property is hardly 
Panglossian—her lecture offers several examples of how poorly conceived 
privatization has fostered social conflict and undermined democratic process—
it is fair to say that she holds property’s glass to be half full.  I propose to 
complement her optimistic portrait by drawing a few examples from the half-
empty part of the glass.  Such examples show, first, that property often 
obscures moral dilemmas by reducing them to questions of apparent 
ownership, and, second, that under some conditions private property can be 
toxic to democratic values and practices.6 
 
 
It is commonplace to note that technological innovations have created new 
forms of property or transformed existing property conventions in significant 
ways.  A familiar example from today’s legal headlines is the assertion of 
ownership of life-forms, cell-lines, and body parts.7  Such cases raise complex 
questions, not all of which involve property concepts.  Still, the overall 
trajectory of legal decisions in the United States seems headed toward 
recognition that parts of the human body may be treated as private property 
under a widening array of circumstances. 
A prominent example is transplantable human organs, now the locus of 
conflict between advocates of market-based policies and those who support a 
non-commodifed “gifting” approach in which donor organs are directed to 
suitable patients according to a protocol of objective needs (an “allocation 
 
 4. Id. at 693–94. 
 5. Id. at 693. 
 6. As a cultural anthropologist, I might have been expected to challenge Professor Rose’s 
analysis on the grounds that it reflects only a Western view of what qualifies as property and how 
property is linked to the political life of human communities.  Such an approach would have 
merit, but in deference to the readership of a law journal I have chosen to restrict my remarks to 
the conceptual framework within which most of my readers are working and which currently 
dominates the global stage.  For recent work that explores dramatically different ways of thinking 
about property, see TRANSACTIONS AND CREATIONS: PROPERTY DEBATES AND THE STIMULUS 
OF MELANESIA (Eric Hirsch & Marilyn Strathern, eds., 2004). 
 7. These issues were discussed in such decisions as Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 
(1980), and Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
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algorithm”) defined by physician–administrators.8  Market-based approaches 
would allow individuals to sell body parts either prior to death (in the case of 
organs such as a kidney, whose donation does not fatally compromise life) or 
post-mortem, in which case surviving family members would be compensated 
for their loved-one’s organs.9 
Arguments for the market approach share much in common with Professor 
Rose’s case for privatization.  Markets are said to work effectively, whereas 
“command economies” do not— and the current system of allocating organs 
for transplant is a classic command economy that has consistently failed to 
meet demand.10  I can envision Professor Rose supporting at least a limited 
right to treat body parts as property for the same reasons that she values 
property relations in other arenas: property’s practical advantages, the relative 
clarity of process when property transactions occur, and the virtues of allowing 
property-holding individuals to manage their own affairs as autonomous 
subjects. 
All this sounds plausible until we contemplate the growth of the global 
traffic in human organs.  Those who have investigated the organ business find 
an arena characterized less by the “propriety of property” than by coercion, 
misrepresentation, and corruption.11  Are destitute people in Brazil, China, or 
South Africa truly free to make a reasoned decision about the sale of their 
kidneys?  Do such bland, reassuring terms as “contract” and “personal choice” 
mean much to people in this situation?  Or is poverty, which puts their own 
lives and the lives of their children at risk, equivalent to a gun at their heads?  
In this scenario, the only element of democracy in evidence is the freedom to 
buy and to sell, the market principle operating with its most brutal efficiency. 
Countless social critics have marveled at the ability of property discourse, 
with its false concreteness and apparent simplicity, to strip away moral 
complexity.12  Where organ transplants are concerned, propertization 
conveniently begs a host of questions.  Can poorly educated organ donors be 
adequately informed about the real risks of sacrificing an organ, especially 
 
 8. This brief excursion into questions of ownership of body parts cannot do justice to the 
nuanced arguments that have been marshaled both for and against commodification of the body.  
See, e.g., Donald Joralemon & Phil Cox, Body Values: The Case Against Compensating for 
Transplant Organs, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.−Feb. 2003, at 27.  For an approach that 
considers the significance of privacy concepts for transplant policy, see Radhika Rao, Property, 
Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359 (2000). 
 9. See generally Joralemon & Cox, supra note 8. 
 10. Julian Sanchez, Whose Organs Are They, Anyway?, REASON ONLINE, June 23, 2003, 
http://www.reason.com/hod/js062603.shtml. 
 11. See Trevor Harrison, Globalization and the Trade in Human Body Parts, 36 CANADIAN 
REV. SOC. & ANTHROPOLOGY 21, 22 (1999); Nancy Scheper-Hughes, The Global Traffic in 
Human Organs, 41 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 191, 191 (2000). 
 12. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 115 
YALE L.J. 72, 113–14 (2005). 
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under the health conditions in which they live?  Given the extent to which even 
privately funded medical procedures generate infrastructural costs that are 
borne by all citizens, do individuals experiencing organ failure have an open-
ended right to seek transplants regardless of their age and health status?  
Although trade in human organs can be seen as an expression of the 
Enlightenment project of reimagining the human body as a morally neutral 
collection of parts rather than a sacred whole, how far should this 
desacralization be allowed to go? 
 
 
Property’s problematic power manifests itself in different ways in current 
concerns about “cultural appropriation,” the fear that elements of folklore and 
traditional knowledge are being privatized by industry through increasingly 
aggressive application of intellectual property (IP) law.13  The most familiar 
instances of this may be the claim—less frequent in actual practice than in the 
popular imagination—that pharmaceutical giants are routinely rewarded by 
handsome profits when they market products whose discovery was made 
possible by tapping the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples.  The 
patent system protects industry but not the communities who have long 
harbored knowledge of the plants from which such products are derived.14  
Other instances of cultural appropriation include the commercial use of 
folkloric art styles, religious symbols, oral traditions, or musical genres, which 
are frequently exploited without seeking prior permission from source 
communities, whose knowledge, by definition, lies in the public domain.15 
Professor Rose acknowledges that IP law poses a significant exception to 
her sunny portrait of property’s role in fostering democracy.16  It is, in her 
words, a “disempowering” force.17  That is certainly how advocates for cultural 
rights see it.  But instead of calling for the attenuation of IP rights, many of 
them vigorously advocate that IP be adapted and expanded to protect culture 
itself.18  At international colloquia it is not unusual to hear calls for the 
implementation of new forms of “cultural copyright” that would protect 
folkloric productions much as IP law protects commercial and artistic ones—
except that cultural protections would be even more restrictive, abandoning the 
time limitations and notions of fair use that counterbalance the privatizing 
 
 13. See Shubha Ghosh, Traditional Knowledge, Patents, and the New Mercantalism (Part I), 
85 J. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 828, 829–30 (2003). 
 14. See generally Thomas Cottier & Marion Panizzon, Legal Perspectives on Traditional 
Knowledge: The Case for Intellectual Property Protection, J. INT’L ECON. L. 371, 372–73 (2004). 
 15. See generally BORROWED POWER: ESSAYS ON CULTURAL APPROPRIATION (Bruce Ziff 
& Pratima V. Rao, eds., 1997). 
 16. Rose, supra note 3, at 715–16. 
 17. Id. at 715. 
 18. See, e.g., Cottier & Panizzon, supra note 14. 
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force of IP law.19  Admittedly, much of this is occurring at the level of rhetoric 
rather than real-world legislation.  Here and there, however, one sees the 
emergence of regulations that take small steps in the direction of redefining 
language and culture as the property of specific groups rather than of humanity 
as a whole.20 
Professor Rose proposes that property rights have an educative function 
that may make them prior to free-speech rights in the experience of most 
citizens.21  But what if law defines political or religious speech as private 
property?  A number of legal commentators fear that such a propertization of 
expression is already under way in the United States.22  Courts are grappling 
with claims that model codes (typically drafted by professional guilds) are 
copyrighted works, that religious texts are similarly copyrighted and therefore 
unavailable to apostate groups, and that political speech making use of 
trademarked language and symbols stands in violation of IP law.23  These 
developments suggest that we may be approaching a tipping point beyond 
which property rights—IP rights in particular—could seriously inhibit the free 
expression of political and artistic thought, keystone elements of democracy. 
 
 
A dram of history serves as a bracing tonic when considering the links 
between property and democracy.  Whenever I am told that private property 
will empower the marginalized and enrich the poor, I think of a much-quoted 
speech that Merrill E. Gates, sixth president of Amherst College, gave to the 
Lake Mohonk Conference in 1896.24  Gates, like many progressive thinkers of 
his time, fervently believed that American Indians were infantilized by the 
communitarian economies around which their societies were organized.25  
 
 19. See Michael F. Brown, Can Culture Be Copyrighted?, 39 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 
193, 196 (1998) (providing details and specific examples). 
 20. See Owen Morgan, Protecting Indigenous Signs and Trade Marks—The New Zealand 
Experiment, 1 INTELL. PROP. Q. 58, 76–78 (2004); MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE 
CULTURE? 83–87 (2003) (providing two examples, both taken from trademark practice). 
 21. Rose, supra note 3, at 701. 
 22. See, e.g., Madhavi Sunder, Note, Authorization and Autonomy as Rites of Exclusion: The 
Intellectual Propertization of Free Speech in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and 
Bisexual Group of Boston, 49 STAN. L. REV. 143 (1996). 
 23. On copyrighted model codes and religious texts, see generally Shubha Ghosh, 
Deprivatizing Copyright, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387 (2003).  On the ways IP law can limit 
political speech, see generally ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTIES (1998). 
 24. ROBERT F. BERKHOFER, JR., THE WHITE MAN’S INDIAN: IMAGES OF THE AMERICAN 
INDIAN FROM COLUMBUS TO THE PRESENT 172–73 (1978). 
 25. Id. at 173. 
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What Indians needed, he insisted, was the “immense moral training that comes 
from the use of property.”26  He continued: 
And the Indian has had all that to learn.  Like a little child who learns the true 
delight of giving away only by first earning and possessing what it gives, the 
Indian must learn that he has no right to give until he has earned, and that he 
has no right to eat until he has worked for his bread. . . . We have found it 
necessary, as one of the first steps in developing a stronger personality in the 
Indian, to make him responsible for property.  Even if he learns its value only 
by losing it, and going without it until he works for more, the educational 
process has begun.27 
Gates’s paean to property’s beneficial impact on American Indians 
exemplifies a political movement whose signal achievement was the passing of 
the General Allotment Act of 1887, also known as the Dawes Act, in 
recognition of its sponsor, Sen. Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts.28  The 
Dawes Act called for the systematic dissolution of Indian reservations, which 
were to be parceled out as individual holdings that would revert to fee-simple 
title after a period of trusteeship.29  Any surplus lands remaining after such 
allotment were available for redistribution at the government’s discretion, and 
somewhere between 60 and 90 million acres of Indian land—estimates vary—
were eventually transferred to non-Indians.30 
Members of Indian tribes where the Dawes Act was fully implemented 
learned the cruelest lessons of private property.  Some sold their land for cash 
to cope with family crises of one sort or another; others saw it confiscated for 
non-payment of debts.31  Landless Indian families fell into poverty and despair 
that surpassed anything seen on communal reservations.32  By the late 1920s, it 
came to be recognized that allotment had been a disastrously misguided policy, 
and it was reversed—at considerable expense to American taxpayers—by the 
Wheeler–Howard Act of 1934, better known as the Indian Reorganization 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388; BERKHOFER, supra note 24, at 
174–75. 
 29. General Allotment Act §§ 1, 5. 
 30. Robert J. Miller, Economic Development in Indian Country: Will Capitalism or 
Socialism Succeed, 80 OR. L. REV. 757, 813 n.199 (2001) (sixty million acres); Jessica A. 
Shoemaker, Comment, Like Snow in the Spring Time: Allotment, Fractionation, and the Indian 
Land Tenure Problem, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 729, 743 (ninety million acres). 
 31. See John E. Thorson, et al., Dividing Western Waters: A Century of Adjudicating Rivers 
and Streams, 8 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 355, 374 (2005) (stating that the events following the 
implementation of the Dawes Act were “harsh” for Indians, many of whom lost their land to state 
tax foreclosures). 
 32. See generally BERKHOFER, supra note 24, at 175. 
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Act.33  To this day, when subjected to homilies about the liberating power of 
private property, Native Americans are likely to check their pockets nervously 
to verify that they haven’t been picked. 
 
 
Such cautionary tales suggest that property neither supports nor subverts 
democracy; it is not an independent variable but one shaped by prevailing 
power relations.  Private property can, as Professor Rose asserts, promote 
democracy when laws are fairly enforced and the state prudently exerts its 
redistributive power.  Conversely, when governments are corrupt, when 
redistribution is abandoned in favor of untrammeled laissez-faire, when 
wealthy citizens are allowed to exert disproportionate control over public 
institutions, then property becomes democracy’s enemy. 
This should make us uneasy about the future of the United States, which, 
according to many studies, is registering record increases in economic 
inequality.34  As the top one percent of the population piles up wealth on a 
scale not seen since the Gilded Age, middle- and working-class incomes 
stagnate or fall.35  The yawning wealth gap between the super-rich and the rest 
of us is already challenging the integrity of American democracy.36  It remains 
to be seen whether property will lead America to new heights, as Lewis Henry 
Morgan believed, or instead poison the well that has long sustained our storied 
republic. 
 
 33. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934); BERKHOFER, supra note 24, at 
179–85; L. Scott Gould, December Song: The Waiting Game for Tribal Sovereignty in Maine, 
ME. B. J., Winter 2005, at 18, 19. 
 34. David Cay Johnston, Corporate Wealth Share Rises for Top-Income Americans, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, at A3 (noting trend toward income inequality). 
 35. See id. 
 36. See, e.g., Christopher Jencks, Our Unequal Democracy, AM. PROSPECT, June 2004, 
http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&articleId=7748. 
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